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i 
Whereas many economists have studied in great detail the process of 
industrialisation in Pakistan, the major emphasis has been either to see the 
effects of different policy measures on industrial growth or to evaluate the 
'efficiency' of the resulting industrial structure. Hardly any studies exist 
on corporate behaviour in Pakistan although over the last few years this 
subject has been the basis for extensive research, both theoretical and 
empirical, in the advanced industrial countries (Galbriath, Marris, Penrose, 
Singh etc.). Clearly a detailed study into such aspects like profitability 
and savings in the corporate sector is of vital importance. Profitability 
determines not only the overall investment climate prevailing in the country 
but relative profitability between different industries will determine the 
pattern of industrial investment. The extent of corporate savings deter 
mines the growth of industrial investment as financed by the corporate 
sector itself. The whole question has now taken on a very important 
dimension as one of the major criticisms levied against the private sector as 
an engine of growth in developing countries is its low saving potential. 
This present study into the growth, profitability and savings of the cor 
porate sector is very limited in its scope and basically an extension of an 
earlier study carried out by Haq and Baqai1 for the period 1959-63 and is 
also based on a sample of companies (except financial institutions) quoted 
on the Karachi Stock Exchange and compiled from data collected by the 
State Bank of Pakistan. By extending Haq and Baqai's original study to 
the later years of the sixties we hope to present a complete picture of 
a very important segment of the corporate sector for the entire period 
1959-70. It should, however, be pointed out in the beginning that as in Haq 
and Baqai, this study is not based on continuous companies and includes 
all new companies that are included for quotation on the Stock Exchange 
each year. Also that these new companies listed on the Stock Exchange 
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do not necessarily represent capital of newly established firms but also the 
'going public' of previously established private or public companies. 
(For a ratio of established to new companies on the Stock Exchange for 
the years 1962-68, (see Appendix Table I). 
Size of the Sample 
Since this study is limited to quoted public limited companies, it is 
important that we should have an idea of the size of our sample in relation 
to the total large scale manufacturing sector in Pakistan. This has been 
done by comparing the total sales of the important industries which we 
have studied with the value of production as given in the Census of Manu 
facturing Industries (CMI) for the year 1965-66. This was the last year 
for which CMI figures are available for both wings of the country. 
TABLE 1 
(Rs. Million) 
CMI Corporate Per cent 
_1965-66_Sector_ 
Cotton Textiles 1494.1 695.2 46.6 
Other Textiles 401.7 123.1 30.6 
Jute 737.1 535.8 72.7 
Cement 201.6 88.3 43.8 
Sugar and Allied 667.0 298.3 44.7 
Fuel and Power 388.5 388.5 100.0 
Chemicals 869.6 103.7 11.9 
4759.6 2232.9 46.9 
Source : Census of Manufacturing Industries 1965-66 C.S.O., Balance Sheet Analysis 
of Joint Stock Companies, State Bank of Pakistan. 
As one can see from the above table the corporate sector covers a reason 
ably large percentage of total industrial production in the case of most of 
the important industries and can, therefore, be taken as a fairly good indi 
cator of the behaviour of the industrial sector. Although it was not 
possible to get corresponding figures for the engineering industry, a rough 
comparison showed it to cover about 25 per cent. In the case of trans 
port and communication, our sample includes the only airway company 
as well as most of the large shipping companies in the country but excludes 
all road transport companies (which are generally very small) and rail 
ways which is in the public sector. 
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Growth of the Corporate Sector 
The number of industrial companies in our study increased from 
131 in 1964 to 223 in 1970 and include almost all the companies quoted on 
the Stock Exchange. In Table 2, we have given a detailed industry-wise 
break down of the number of companies included in the sample for the years 
1965to 1970. 
TABLE 2 
Industry-wise break down of Number of Companies in Sample* (1965-70). 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Cotton Textiles 33 (4) 33 (2) 37 (2) 43 (7) 51 (5) 64 (5) 
Other Textiles 11(2) 11(1) 12(1) 14(1) 14 
Jute 12 (2) 12 (1) 14 (3) 14 (4) 17 (2) 19 
Chemicals 9 (5) 9 (4) 10 (5) 12 (5) ll (2) 12 (1) 
Engineering 15 15 18 (2) 18 (1) 18 18 
Fuel and Power 15 (2) 15 (2) 16 (1) 17 (2) 18 18 
Transport and Communication 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Sugar and Allied 11(3) 12(2) 15(3) 16(3) 16(3) 16 
Cement 5 (1) 5 5 5 5 5 
Others 25 26 32 (3) 35 (3) 38 (4) 51 (7) 
Total 142 144 165 180 194 223 
?Figures in parenthesis refer to companies included in the sample but which have either 
not started production or have just started and are producing far below their capacity 
level. 
TABLE 3 
Growth in size of Public Limited Companies 1964-70 
(Rs. Crores) 
Industry Paid-up Capital Net Worth Net Assets 
Per cent Per cent Per cent 
_1964 1970 increase 1964 1970 increase 
1964 1970 increase 
Textiles and 
Allied 36.8 80.8 119.6 59.6 118.8 99.3 78.2 178.9 128.8 
Jute 16.9 35.7 111.2 25.7 48.9 90.3 31.0 74.5 140.3 
Cement 10.4 13.5 29.8 13.2 23.6 78.8 22.0 34.7 57.7 
Chemicals 8.3 25.8 210.8 12.2 29.1 138.5 12.9 47.0 264.3 
Engineering 7.5 16.2 129.3 10.5 24.1 129.5 12.7 32.7 157.5 
Fuel and Power 25.5 55.5 117.6 45.0 98.6 119.1 77.0 171.0 122 1 
Transport 16.5 25.4 353.8 24.5 45.9 87.3 40.8 80.5 97.3 
Sugar and Allied 8.9 29.2 228.1 13.6 42.0 208.8 8.7 59.2 216.6 
Others 35.2 59.9 70.2 52.7 88.0 67.0 61.7 125.5 103.4 
AU Industries 166.0 342.0 106.0 257.0 519.0 101.9 355.0 804.0 126.6 
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1964 1970 (Rs. Millions) 
Average size of the Company 
(Paid-up Capital) 
Average Net Worth. 
Average Net Assets. 
12.67 
19.61 
27.10 
15.33 
23.27 
36.05 
The growth in size of public limited companies for the period 
1964-70 is shown in Table 3. Paid-up capital, net worth and net 
assets doubled over the seven years period showing increases of 106, 101.9 
and 126.5 percent respectively. The average size of the company as 
represented by paid-up capital increased from Rs. 12.67 million to 
Rs. 15.33 million (an increase of 20.9 per cent) and the average net worth 
from Rs. 19.61 million to Rs. 23.27 million (an increase of 18.7 percent). 
The figure for average net assets increased from Rs. 27.1 million to 
Rs. 36.05 million and since over the years the difference between net assets 
and net worth increased, it shows that firms were relying more on loan 
capital than they had done previously. 
Industry-wise break down shows that the largest increases were for 
sugar and chemical industries followed by engineering, jute and textile 
and allied industries. In the case of sugar and chemicals, net assets 
increased by as much as 217 and 264 per cent respectively. 
Measurement of Profitability 
The overall trend of profitability of the corporate sector is most 
important as it not only reflects the state of demand for new investment 
during the period but is also a close reflection of the degree of competi 
tion prevailing in the economy besides showing the profitability of new 
investments which are undertaken. 
The real problem in measuring profitability, however, is not only in 
finding accurate and reliable figures of profits but also in deciding upon 
the appropriate indicator of profitability that should be used. It is well 
known that figures for profits as shown in balance-sheets of companies 
must be viewed with considerable amount of suspicion. Evasion of taxes 
is rampant among almost all companies and this is done by understating 
their actual profits. This leaves one with no other alternative but to work 
on the assumption that the practice of showing lower profits remained 
about the same throughout the period and is generally the same among 
different industries. A study of profitability over a period of time can 
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then be taken as a good indicator of the general trend even if it is not 
a good reflection of the absolute level of profits. 
The other difficulty arises as to what should be taken as the best indi 
cator of company profits. The net pre-tax profit figure is a good indicator 
but since depreciation charges are calculated on the basis of tax 
concessions, it seriously under-estimates profits. The figure for gross 
profits as shown in the State Bank statistics is simply arrived at by sub 
tracting cost of production and opening stocks from net sales and closing 
stocks but includes operating expenses (like selling expenses, general and 
administrative expenses and managing agents allowance and commission) 
and also other expenses like interest charges and is, therefore, not an 
indicator of profits earned. 
The figure for gross profits as used in this study in the sum of depre 
ciation and net profits before tax. This to a large extent covers the 
weakness of the figure for gross profits as defined by the State Bank, as 
is excludes operating expenses. However, managing agencies remunera 
tion were in fact a convenient way of siphoning off profits by the 
industrialists who owned both the managing agency as well as the company. 
(The actual services rendered by the managing agencies were in fact 
almost negligible). The best indicator of profits would in these circum 
stances be the gross profit figure used by us plus managing agencies 
remuneration. Since the State Bank does not provide a separate figure 
for managing agencies remuneration it has not been possible to do this 
and we have therefore used the gross profit figure. 
We have also not been able to get figures for 1964-70 for profitability 
as shown by the ratio of gross profits to gross capital employed. The 
latter was defined in Haq and Baqai's study as the sum of gross fixed assets 
and inventory accumulation. Since the State Bank does not give a 
figure for inventories we have not been able to calculate gross capital 
employed. Also since Haq and Baqai's study has not given the figures 
for net assets, this leaves us in the unfortunate position of having only 
one comparable profitability ratio for the whole period 1959-70, that of 
gross profits to net worth. 
We have used the following indicators to measure profitability. They 
together with their weaknesses are explained below : 
Indicator /, Net Profits before Tax/Net Assets. The ratio of net 
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pre-tax profits to net assets is generally the most accepted indicator to 
measure the rate of return. To the extent that depreciation charges are 
calculated on tax considerations (which allow a higher initial and accele 
rated depreciation for providing incentives to investment), this will under 
estimate the rate of return on investment. 
Indicator II, Gross Profits/Net Assets. This indicator covers the 
weakness of Indicator I in that gross profits is derived by adding deprecia 
tion allowance to pre-tax profits. As has been pointed out, it does not 
include managing agencies remuneration and therefore also under 
estimates profitability. 
Indicator III, Gross Profits/Net Worth. The figure for gross profits 
is taken as a return of net worth (which is ordinary share capital plus 
reserves) and is important from the investors point of view. 
II 
Overall Economic Situation 
Before we discuss the trends in profitability, let us first get an overall 
view of the economic situation prevailing in the country during this period. 
The economic boom in the Second Plan (1960-65) had been brought about 
principally through increased foreign assistance (which rose by 12.5 per cent 
per annum in the Second Plan period) and increased exports (which grew 
by 7.6 per cent annually). This had made it possible to achieve an increase 
in private investment from 4.5 per cent of GNP in 1959-60 to 9.5 per cent 
in 1964-65 and a 15 per cent growth in large-scale manufacturing. An 
impressive increase in agricultural production of 3.4 per cent during the 
Second Plan made it possible to save foreign exchange which would 
otherwise have been spent to import food grains. The resulting improve 
ment in the country's balance of payment position had made it possible to 
follow a liberal import policy which was operated through the bonus 
voucher scheme. 
These trends in the economy, especially progressive liberalization and 
a rising level of imports suffered a reversal in the first two years of the 
Third Plan (1965-70), because of a sharp decline in the amount of foreign 
exchange resources available for financing commodity imports. This situa 
tion was principally brought about through a suspension of foreign aid 
assistance following the September, 1965 War with India and although it 
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was restored, it was still 27 per cent less in the Third Plan period than had 
been expected. 
The curtailment of aid, however, was not the only factor. There 
were a number of other important factors which worsened this situation. 
The first was the extraordinary large claims made by the defence forces 
on Pakistan's exchange resources arising out of the war with India and the 
cessation of military grant assistance from abroad. Second, the first two 
years of the Plan saw the agricultural sector faced with a severe drought 
with the volume of production of major crops in 1965/66 and 1966-67 
remaining stagnant and roughly at the 1964-65 level and with food crops 
as a group showing a decline in production. These difficulties were made 
particularly acute by the fact that foodgrain imports had to be increased 
at a time when less PL-480 assistance was available, so that the country's 
own resources had to be diverted more to financing sizeable food 
imports. Finally, the economy was faced with large sums to be paid for 
debt servicing, on previous assistance and also greater reliance had to be 
made on short-term credits. 
By 1967-68, the economy had recovered primarily because of a tre 
mendous increase in agricultural production. It broke down again in the 
autumn of 1968 because of large scale political agitation against the Ayub 
Government which led to widespread labour unrest. This movement 
brought about the downfall of Ayub's Government in March, 1969, the 
proclamation of Martial Law and although the law and order situation 
improved, the fact that elections were promised in the near future, led to a 
complete collapse of investor's confidence and industrial investment fell 
drastically. 
III 
Ratio of Gross Profits to Sales: 1959-70 
Haq and Baqai have discussed in detail the causes of the decline in 
the ratio between profitability and sales for the period 1959-63. Their 
basic argument is that there was growing competition in the manufacturing 
sector both as a result of increase in domestic production and the avail 
ability of imported substitutes. The latter was the result of liberalization 
of import controls especially the operation of the bonus scheme which set 
a ceiling on the permissible increases in the domestic prices of imported 
goods.2 
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The mark-up ratio continued to show a declining trend during the 
rest of the period 1964-70 (see Table 4). In 1970, it was 25 per cent lower 
as compared to 1964 and 33 per cent less than what it had been in 1959. 
For the last two years of the Second Plan period i.e., 1963-65 as in 
the earlier years it appears that the principal factor responsible was the 
import liberalization policy which the government had introduced. 
Readily available imports increased capacity utilization and also kept 
a check on domestic price increases. Mark-up ratios fell on the average 
7.8 per cent per year during 1964 and 1965 and compared to 1959 they 
were 17.7 per cent lower in 1965. 
During the period 1965-70, there was a fall of 18.5 per cent in mark 
up ratios but a completely different set of factors seem to be responsible 
for it. 
If we ignore the drastic fall in 1967 (which was the result of special 
circumstances prevailing in the jute industry) the major reason for the 
decline in the mark-up ratios over this period was the general rise in the 
price level and the improvement in the terms of trade in favour of agricul 
ture in relation to the manufacturing sector.3 The rise in prices of agri 
cultural commodities was triggered off by a severe draught in 1966 and 
1967 which led to a sharp rise in foodgrain prices. Profits failed to 
keep up with rising prices as costs increased-the general price index 
being 137 in 1968-69 compared to 112.4 in 1964-65 (1959-60=100). The 
price index for foodgrains was 141.8 and that of manufactures 127.8 
in 1968-69 compared to 112.1 and 107.1 in 1964-65. 
This situation was further worsened by the fact that the industrial 
sector was hit by considerable labour unrest in 1968 and the first quarter 
of 1969. This led to a large number of working days being lost through 
strikes. Even though the labour situation stabilized with the imposition 
of Martial Law in May, 1969, the new government announced new labour 
laws and a minimum wage (September, 1969) which led to increase 
in wage costs in 1970 and explains the fall in the mark-up ratio between 
1969 and 1970. 
Ratio of Gross Profits to Sales-Industry-wise 
The ratio of gross profits to sale i.e..the mark-up ratio is important 
amongst others because it highlig ts the factors which effect the pricing 
policy followed in different industries. 
LO > > o Q 2 H 5 O co 
TABLE 4 
Ratio of Gross P fits toSale ,Ne  Assets andt Wor h 1959-70. 
( Rs. Crores ) 
HAQ ANDB AI STATEANK OF P KISTAN 
1959 6019 1 621963 1964 51 66 71 68 19 9 0
1- GROSS PROFITS 26.2 33.3 
36.8 
42 2 52.2 60 62 73 70 94 112 122 
2. GROSS SALES 133.3 74 515 226 4834  45056679
3. Ratio ofIto 2 19.7 017.1 8 6262 4543
4. Change in 
Mark-up Ratio -3.7 -10.0 +8.8 -0.2 -7.7 9 - -23.46 +21.8 -2.0 -8.3 
5. NET WORTH 98.2120.3 46 46920557 3 437291451
6. Ratio of Ito 5 2785 3.3 20 41 814 023.5 
7. NET ASSETS NAA 3554 4512 806277 4 80
8. Ratio of Ito 7 NA 16.9 3 74 32 15 0 52
9. PAID-UP C PITAL 78.1 2 7112 6.3 506982053  734
10. Ratiooflto9 33.6 35.9 2.8 33.4 34.7 6.2 31.3 5 629.7 36.9 37.7 35.7 
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We can start by looking at the extreme case where the price of the 
product is regulated by the government and the producers are allowed 
a fixed amount of profits per unit of output. In this case higher costs 
will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices but since the 
profit rate is fixed producers will face declining mark-up ratios. The 
best example of this is the fuel and power industry where prices are con 
trolled and regulated by the government. 
In the case of industries where prices are regulated by market forces 
the movement of mark-up ratios is influenced by a number of factors. 
The most important of course are the forces of competition either because 
of entry of new firms into the industry or because of liberalization of 
import policy. Early enterants into the market having monopoly 
or near monopoly control can charge very high mark-up ratios but 
these would be eroded as new firms enter the industry leading to increased 
production and lowering prices. Similarly, industries enjoying pro 
tection from imported goods would be able to charge higher mark-up 
ratios which would be adversely effected if the government followed a 
more liberal import policy and subject the industry to the forces of out 
side competition. 
Increased production, however, need not lead to lowering of mark 
up ratio when new companies are in the control of the same industrial 
houses or there exist cartel like arrangements between the firms in the 
industry. Also increase in efficiency of production or lower costs of 
inputs in most cases result in higher mark-up ratios rather than being 
passed on in the form of lower prices. 
Our study does not permit us to make any generalization about how 
firms fix prices |and unfortunately no such study for Pakistan exists. 
What our results of mark-up ratios and profitability seem to show is that 
firms concentrate on maintaining the latter rather than the former. There 
seems to be good logic in following such a principle. Investors are pri 
marily interested in recovering their initial investment in the minimum 
time period and therefore wish to maximise profits on capital invested. 
Also more important is the fact that in most of the industries the govern 
ment plays an important part in determining prices. This is done either 
through the rate of bonus in the case of exports or through controlling 
prices of major inputs or in certain cases of controlling prices of 
VD -J to 
TABLE 5 Ratio of Gross 
Profits 
to Sales-Industry-wise 
1959 6019 1 621963 4561967 81 9 70
1. TEXTILES 
AND LLIED 25.8 4 5019.98 47 36 14 25
2. COTTON TEX ILES NA 17.0 5 64 216 315.4 3. OTHER TEXTILES NA 20.1 193 94 86 55 713.5 4. JUTE 21.3 .0 6 9 20 419 84 737 099.31 1
5. CEMENT 40.9 13 86 120.4 45 32 07 13 8616 7
6. CHEMICALS 19.4 25 62 90.5 8 8117.4 3.0 2
7. ENGINEERING A D 
CONSTRUCTION 21.9 1 39.8 7240.02 66.211 5 9.4 8. FUELANDPOWER 43.8 4 4.6 931 1 24 0515 47
9. TRANSPORT 10.4 1 97 25 122.8 1.02 .69  7.1
10. SUGAR AND LLIED7.129 36.1 3 2915 30 52 0 9.5 4
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commodities themselves. This makes it difficult for the firm to be able 
to influence the mark-up ratios. 
Our results for the period 1964-70 show a far more stable level of 
profitability as compared to a declining overall level of gross profits to 
sales and seems to support this hypothesis. Whereas the latter fell by 
25 per cent between 1964 and 1970'and by 33 per cent between 1959 and 
1970, profitability as measured by the ratio of gross profits to net worth 
was the same in 1964 as in 1970 and fell by only 11 per cent between 1959 
and 1970. (Table 4). 
Industry-wise break down of the ratios of gross profits to sales (Table 5) 
seems to confirm that where firms were able to fix prices they were able 
to maintain mark-up ratios, whereas where prices were controlled by the 
government, they were subject to declining mark-up ratios. The best 
example of reasonably steady mark-up ratios is the case of cotton textiles 
where prices were demand-determined and this should be contrasted to 
that of fuel and power where prices were fixed by the government. Fluc 
tuating prices seem to be the main factor in explaining the wide changes 
in the jute industry whereas increased competition pulled down the ratio 
in the case of cement. Engineering and construction had a steady 
mark-up ratio from 1960 onwards as did transport and communications 
after 1964. The sugar industry enjoyed a marked rise in the ratio of 
gross profits to sales once the industry was freed from government con 
trolled prices after 1962 and with the exception of 1967 (which was a very 
bad crushing season) maintained reasonably high mark-up ratios. 
Profitability 
One of the interesting results of this study is that whereas mark-up 
ratios declined, the profitability ratios were far more stable during the 
entire period 1959-70. In Table 6 we have calculated a three year moving 
average of profitability for this period, excluding the year 1967 which was 
an exceptional year because of the dismal profits of the jute industry. 
When looking into the profitability of the industrial sector one must 
never forget that profitability as shown by the balance sheets of companies, 
considerably underestimates the actual profitability. It is a well known 
fact that the actual rate of return on industrial investment for most 
industries was so high in the beginning of oui period th t industrialists 
recovered their own investment in one and a half to two years. Since 
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TABLE 6 
Profitability-Three Year Moving Average 
GROSS PROFITS/ 
PAID-UP CAPITAL 
GROSS PROFITS/ 
NET WORTH 
GROSS PROFITS/ 
NET ASSETS 
sss 
os ^ n so vo Os Os Os 
3 
vo 
Os 
vo 
ON 
VO 
VO 
i VO ON 
5 VO 
o> 
VO 
OS 
30.8 34.0 33.6 34.8 34.7 34.4 34.6 36.7 36.8 
26.7 26.0 25.0 24.4 22.9 21.8 22.7 23.4 24.0 
- 15.0 14.4 15.0 15.2 
the rate of return on paid-up capital was as high, if not higher at the end 
of the period it shows that industrial investment was still a very attractive 
proposition. The decline in industrial investment after 1965, therefore 
cannot be attributed to falling profitability. The real problems arose 
on the supply side. Principally they were the coming into operation of 
the foreign exchange constraint which acted as a brake on investment 
after 1965 and this situation was further worsened after 1969 when poli 
tical uncertainty led to collapse of investors confidence. 
Also we find that throughout the period 1959 to 1970 the ratio of 
gross profits to net worth was almost double that of gross profits to net 
assets. This shows the heavy dependence of firms on loaned capital. 
Since the lending rates of financial institutions were on the average much 
lower than profitability rates they pushed up considerably profitability 
on net worth and paid-up capital. 
A much better explanation of the fluctuations in the profitability rate 
lies in a detailed study of the different industries which comprise the over 
all data. This is because different factors effected profitability of dif 
ferent industries at different time periods and this would only come out 
if we study each industry separately. 
Profitability-Industry-wise 
Industry-wise comparisons of profitability can be had from Table 7 
which shows that the highest profitability as given by gross profits to 
net worth was in the case of transport and communications followed by 
sugar, fuel and power and engineering and construction industry. A 
change in rankings between industries takes place if we use the ratio of 
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gross profits to net assets as the profitability indicator with engineering 
and construction industry being the highest followed by sugar and cotton 
textiles. The large decline between the ratio of gross profits to net worth 
and gross profits to net assets in the case of transport and fuel and power 
is because of their heavy dependence on borrowed capital. 
TABLE 7 
Profitability-Industry-wise Average 1964-70 
Gross Profits/ Gross Profits/ NetPre-Tax 
Net Worth Net Assets Profits/ 
Net Assets 
1. Cotton Textiles 21.9 16.9 12.5 
2. Other Textiles 14.2 7.2 4.7 
3. Jute 17.9 13.7 10.0 
4. Cement 17.2 10.7 7.4 
5. Chemicals 13.1 8.9 6.4 
6. Engineering and Construction 23.2 19.2 14.8 
7. Fuel and Power 26.2 14.5 9.5 
8. Transport and Communication 30.3 16.6 9.1 
9. Sugar 26.9 18.4 13.1 
The trend in profitability for the'different industries between 1964 
and 1970 is given in Table 8. (Detailed information concerning other 
profitability indicators is given in Appendix Tables II and III). 
Our study of the textile industry clearly shows why it is very important 
to separate cotton from other textiles, a fact over-looked by Haq and 
Baqai who studied both together. Profitability in the case of the cotton 
textile industry is more than double that of other textiles as measured 
by the ratio of gross profits to net assets. The cotton textile industry 
showed a slight decline in profitability between 1964 and 1967 after which 
it recovered mostly because of the increase in bonus on exports of yarn 
and cloth. The fall in profitability in 1970 was because the industry was 
hit by a number of strikes. In order to remove any bias in the figure for 
profitability because of the entry of new firms we carried out the same 
exercise for twenty-eight continuous companies. Our results were not 
much different from that of the entire sample and showed that new 
enterants were either companies already in production or that they did not 
face any special difficulties on entry. 
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TABLE 8 
Profitability--Industry-wise Ratio of Gross Profits to Net Worth 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Cotton Textiles 22.9 20.1 19.5 19.5 21.6 26.7 22.9 
Other Textiles 13.2 13.3 12.9 12.3 18.6 15.5 13.5 
Jute 21.7 17.4 25.4 10.0 14.7 18.2 17.7 
Cement 18.2 18.3 15.8 16.4 17.0 19.1 15.4 
Chemicals 13.9 15.8 14.2 15.4 7.0 14.8 16.1 
Engineering and 
Construction 27.6 20.9 25.5 21.7 24.7 23.7 18.3 
Fuel and Power 25.3 23.1 23.7 23.5 28.5 28.8 30.6 
Transport and 
Communication 28.3 31.8 27.1 29.4 33.3 33.7 28.9 
Sugar 41.9 22.1 24.8 15.5 28.8 27.2 27.9 
In the case of other textiles one major reason for their poor per 
formance was the Koh-i-Noor Rayon plant which although being the 
biggest firm in the industry had very low level of profits mostly because 
of an unfavourable Government policy regarding the import of rayon. 
Also Karnaphully Rayon and Chemical plant, located in East Pakistan 
had a low level of profitability although its performance was better that 
of Koh-i Noor Rayon. Between them they accounted for almost 55 
per cent of the net worth of the industry. 
Jute industry showed wide fluctuations in profitability. The abys 
mally low figure in 1967 is explained by almost all companies as being 
due to the devaluation of the sterling and the reduced export duty on 
jute by India. The general trend for the entire period showed a decline 
and profits were much lower on the average in the Third Five Year Plan 
as compared to the Second. In fact for the period 1964-70 the average 
profitability of the jute industry was among the lowest in the group of 
industries covered and this is in striking contrast to its performance 
during 1959-63 when it had the highest rate of return. 
The chemical industry showed the lowest profitability rate amongst 
all the industries and this is indeed very surprising as it was the second 
fastest growing industry during the period 1964-70. One reason for 
the low level of profitability is the entry of new firms into the industry which 
were either not in production or were working far below their capacity 
levels. The very low profitability figure in 1968 was, because Esso 
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Fertilizer and Valika Chemicals, two of the largest companies in the 
industry sustained heavy losses in their initial stages of production. 
In order to remove the bias of new companies in the chemical industry 
we worked out profitability in the case of four continuous companies 
(Ferozsons, Glaxo, ICI and Pakistan Oxygen). The average profitability 
as, given by the ratio of gross profits to net worth for the period 1964-70 
was 23.1 and gross profits to net assets was 21.7-the latter being the 
highest amongst all the industries studied. This seems to confirm the 
hypothesis that one reason for the low profitability of the chemical industry 
was the fact that it included a number of new companies which in their 
earlier stages were experiencing considerable difficulty. 
The sugar industry in Haq and Baqai's study had shown a big jump 
in profitability between 1962 and 1963 when it increased from 12 to 34 
per cent. This sharp increase in profitability was becasue of a major 
change in government policy regarding this industry when it allowed 
the sale of part of its produce in the open market. The large decline in 
profitability between 1964 and 1965 was brought about by an influx of 
new companies attracted by the very high profit rate. Net assets of the 
industry increased by more than 55 per cent during these two years leading 
to a fall in the profit rate. 
The figures for the cement industry in Haq and Baqai's study had 
shown a declining trend between 1959 and 1963 when they fell from 31 
to 25 per cent but during the period 1964-70 they remained generally stable. 
In the case of fuel and power industry which comprised of a number of 
oil refineries, gas distribution and electric supply companies profitability 
rate had remained fairly steady during the period 1959-63 but in our study 
it showed an increase after 1967 and it was 25 per cent higher in 1970 as 
compared to 1964. 
Our present treatment of engineering and construction companies 
is highly unsatisfactory as it lumps together the automobile industry, 
electrical engineering, mechanical engineering and construction companies 
together. On the whole the average profitability was lowest in the 
construction industry as compared to the others. There was also con 
siderable variation in the profitability ratio of companies in each group. 
In the automobile industry for example Ghandara had a phenomenally 
high profit rate (60 per cent is the ratio of net pre-tax profits to net worth 
1973] AMJAD: GROWTH, PROFITABILITY AND SAVINGS 1964-70 433 
for 1965) as compared to Mack Trucks which sustained a loss throughout 
the period. This industry had the highest profitability ratio as given by 
gross profits to net assets for the period 1964-70 amongst all the 
industries studied. The average was also much higher during this period 
as compared to 1959-63. 
IV 
Distribution of Gross Profits 
From the point of view of corporate savings, as Haq and Baqai pointed 
out in their study, the crucial decision on the part of management is the 
ratio of profits to be distributed to the share-holders as dividends and the 
amount to be re-invested for expanding the operations of the enterprise. 
The savings potential of the corporate sector is of considerable interest 
especially since a number of studies have cast doubts on the saving capacity 
of the private sector.4 
Our study of corporate savings has been limited by a major change 
in the figures for tax provision as . given by the 1964-69 series and the 
1965-70 series. In the latter series there is a considerable drop in tax 
provision as compared to the former series. 
The reason for this fall is because the basis followed for calculating 
tax provision was revised by the State Bank when they published the 
1965-70 series. Whereas the item 'tax provision' comprised current 
year tax provision, reserve for taxation and deferred taxation for the 
1964-69 series, for the 1965-70 series it consists only of current year tax 
provision. We have therefore used the series 1964-69 for the disposal 
of gross profits to make it comparable with the earlies 1959-63 series. 
Tax Provision 
In Table 9 we have shown the distribution of gross profits as given 
by the 1964-69 series. The percentage set aside for tax provision for 
the years 1964-69 is much lower (22.7 per cent) as compared to the 
average for 1959-63 (28 per cent) and the figure for retention is higher 
being 25 percent as compared to 22.6 per cent for 1959-63. The only 
major change in government's taxation policy reg rding the corporate 
sector was in the 1965-66 budget when tax-rebate in favour of public 
limited companies was raised from 5 to 10 per cent and this reduced 
taxes from 50 per cent to 45 per cent.5 Although this can explain to 
6 25 3 > Z co Og > 3 2 H 
TABLE 9 
Distribution of Gross P f ts (Series 1964-69). 
( Rs. Crores ) 
Average 
Average 
1964 1965 1966 1967 19 8 1969 1964-69 594 
_(%) (%) 
1. Gross Profits 60 64 7597 112 
2. Retention 18(30) 19(27) 
22(29) 
12(16) 21(22) 27(24) 24.7 22.6 
3. Depreciation 16(27) 18(28) 20(27) 26(35) 32(33) 35(31) 0.228.8 4. T x Provision 16(27) 14(22) 16(21) 17(23) ( 2)2(20) 2 .58.4 5. Dividends 10(17) 13(20.3) 
17(23) 
20(27) 23(24) 28(25) 22.7 20.2 6.Gross Savings 34(57) 37(58) 42 ( 6)38(51) 53 ( 5)82(55) 5 .31.4 
7. Retention Ratio (64) (60) (56) (38) (48) (49) 52.5 52.8 
Note : Figures inpar nthesis a e percentages. 
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some extent the fall in tax provision from 1965 onwards, this certainly 
was not the major reason. The real reason for the fall in tax provision 
as a percentage of gross profits was the coming into production of 
industries which enjoyed complete tax holiday. The Government had 
after 1960 announced measures which gave systematic tax exemptions in 
the form of tax holidays to a large number of approved industries. Haq 
and Baqai had taken note of the fact that the ratio of tax provision to 
gross profits had remained stable throughout the period 1959-63 and 
that companies entitled to tax holiday had not gone into production 
by 1963. It appears that during the period 1964-70 a large number of 
companies enjoying tax holiday were now in production. 
Gross Savings 
The figure for gross savings defined as the sum of retained earnings 
and depreciation, for 1964-69 too is higher as compared to the average 
for 1959-63. The average for 1964-69 is 55 per cent as compared to 
51 per cent for the years 1959-63. This means that throughout the period 
gross savings accounted for more than half of gross profits. 
Dividends 
One of the major changes in Government's policy during this period 
was in regard to the dividends paid out by the corporate sector. In the 
1967-68 budget,6 the Government announced as series of measures to 
encourage the distribution of dividends, and levied income tax at the rate 
of 10 per cent on so much amount of free reserves of a company as in 
excess of 100 per cent of the paid-up capital. They also were to pay an 
additional tax of 5 per cent on their undistributed income but would be 
allowed a rebate of 10 per cent in their existing rebates in respect to the 
amount distributed as dividend out of the income of that year. With the 
same objective in mind, tax holiday companies which had to set aside 
60 per cent of their profits for the purpose of development and expansion 
was reduced to 40 per cent. The companies had to distribute the 
balance, namely 60 per cent of the profits or an amount equal to 10 
per cent dividend, whichever was the less. 
This change in Government's policy regarding distribution of divi 
dends resulted in a large increase in the amount distributed out of gross 
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profits. The average for 1967-70 was 25 per cent as compared to 
20 per cent for the period 1959-66. 
This increase in the amount paid out as dividend is reflected in the 
retention ratio which is defined as retained earnings divided by the sum of 
retained earnings and dividends. This ratio does not show any increase 
in the period 1964-69 as compared to the 1959-63 series, although 
gross savings increased. This was because the increase in retained 
earnings this period was offset by the rise in the dividends which led to the 
retention ratio remaining constant. 
TABLE 10 
Disposal of Gross Profits-Industry-wise Average 1964-69 
Gross Depreciation Retained Dividend Tax 
Savings Earnings Provision 
1. Textiles and Allied 49.6 27.2 22.4 26.0 24.4 
(a) Cotton Textiles 50.0 26.3 23.7 25.6 4.4
(b) Other Textiles 47.8 31.8 16.0 27.5 24.7 
2. Jute 50.8 27.9 22.9 29.7 19.5 
3. Cement 63.6 25.3 38.3 24.7 11.7 
4. Chemicals 31.5 35.9 -4.5 33.1 35.5 
5. Engineering and Construction 44.9 22.3 22.6 24.1 31.0 
6. Fuel and Power 54.3 35.2 19.1 20.6 25.1 
7. Transport and Communication 86.7 47.0 39.7 10.6 2.7 
8. Sugar 49.4 20.8 28.6 26.0 24.6 
Industry-wise Analysis 
Industry-wise breakdown of the disposal of corporate profits amongst 
gross savings, retained earnings, dividends and depreciations on the 
average for the period 1964-69 is given in Table 10. (For detailed 
year-wise breakdown given in Appendix Tables IV to VI). It is 
interesting to see that with the exception of the chemical industry all 
other industries saved almost half of their gross profits. In almost all the 
industries the percentage set aside for gross savings was around 50 
per cent with the exception of cement, 63.6 per cent, and transport and 
communication which had an extraordinarily high figure of 86.7 per cent. 
In the case of the latter the major factor responsible was the very high 
savings rate of the state managed airline corporation, P.I.A. 
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One striking feature about the disposal of gross profits is that the 
amount set aside for dividend, with the exception of transport and com 
munication showed very slight variation between the different industries. 
It is about 25 percent in the case of cotton textiles, other textiles, engineer 
ing and construction and sugar industry despite the wide variations in 
their profitability ratios. The slightly higher figure of 30 per cent in the 
case of jute and chemical industry is that because of their low level 
of profitability they had to set aside a larger percentage for dividends. 
The very low figure of 10.6 per cent in the case of transport and communi 
cations is explained by the very high savings, especially retained earnings 
in this industry and because P.I.A. followed a system of providing travel 
vouchers to their shareholders in place of cash dividends. 
The figure for depreciation varies between 20 and 35 per cent of 
gross profits with the exception of transport and communication which is 
47 per cent. There is, however, considerable variation in the figure for 
retained earnings which ranges from 4.5 per cent for chemicals to almost 
40 per cent for transport and communication. It appears that most 
industries were therefore principally concerned with the sum set aside for 
depreciation and dividend and retained earnings was a residue and this 
explains its wide variations among the different industries. 
Conclusion 
In looking at the results of this study one must keep in mind the fact 
that with the exception of the jute industry most of the firms in the 
different industries covered by the sample were located in West Pakistan. 
This was the case for cotton textiles, cement, chemicals, fuel and power, 
engineering and sugar, where only a very small number of the companies 
were located in East Pakistan. To the extent that profitability differed 
in the two provinces this study for these industries must be seen as mostly 
relevant to West Pakistan. 
The period of our study was one which witnessed a very large increase 
in the number of companies quoted on the Stock Exchange. Although 
the increase was not only because of newly floated companies but also of 
.existing companies which went public, a cursory survey by the World 
Bank indicated that the vast majority of this increase was due to new 
companies. During the years 1964 to 1970, paid-up capital, net worth 
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and net assets of companies more than doubled with the largest increase 
in the sugar and chemical industries which showed increases in net assets 
of more than 200 and 250 per cent respectively. They were followed by 
engineering (152 percent)* jute (140 percent), transport and communi 
cation (137 per cent) and textiles and allied (129 per cent). 
Our study of mark-up ratios showed a declining trend throughout the 
period 1964-70 as the earlier study of Haq and Baqai had shown for 1959 
63. It appears that during the Second Plan period this was due to import 
liberalization policies followed by the Government which kept prices under 
control. During 1965-70, the general rise in costs and the turning of the 
terms of trade in favour of agriculture seems to be responsible for the 
decline. Industry-wise break down of mark-up ratios showed that in the 
case of industries where prices were largely under government controls 
there was a large decline in mark-up ratios as increasing costs were passed 
on in the form of higher prices but profit margins remained constant. In 
the case of industries where prices were determined largely by market prices 
as in the case of cotton textiles the general level remained stable. Our 
study of mark-up ratios is, however, not exhaustive enough to put us in a 
position to speak with confidence on the pricing policy followed by firms 
in various industries. 
Our study of profitability showed that on the whole profitability ratios 
remained fairly stable during the period covered. Industry-wise break 
downs, however, showed considerable fluctuations and marked differences 
between various industries. The fairly high and stable profitability ratio 
for cotton textiles compared to a much lower figure for other textiles showed 
the importance of studying the two separately. Jute industry showed 
considerable fluctuations in profitability with much lower profits on the 
average during the Third as compared to the Second Plan period. Fuel 
and power industry where prices were controlled by the government showed 
fairly stable profitability ratios. The chemical industry showed why it is 
important to include only those companies in the sample which had started 
production and how the inclusion of new companies can give a mislead 
ing picture of profitability in the industry. A study of four continuous 
companies showed a much higher level of profitability as compared to the 
total number of companies covered by the sample. 
Our study of gross savings as the sum of retained earnings and 
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depreciation reserves showed an increase during 1964-69 as compared to 
the earlier period 1959-63. This means that there was no fallin corporate 
savings during this period as is claimed by certain studies. 
The two major changes regarding the distribution of gross profits 
occured for tax provision and dividends distributed by the companies 
during this period. In the case of tax provision the fact that percentage 
declined from 28.4 per cent for 1959-63 to 22.5 per cent for 1964-69 showed 
that a large number of companies coming into production during this 
period enjoyed tax holiday status. The increase in the dividends ratio 
after 1967 was the result of government policy to encourage companies 
to pay out higher dividends through tax concessions. It appears that 
government's policy bore fruit but whether it had the desired effect on the 
stock exchange and helped mobilize domestic savings for the corporate 
sector was not covered by this study. 
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APPENDIX 
The increase in the number of companies quoted on the Stock 
Exchange took place not only because of new companies being floated but 
also as a result of conversion of private companies or partnerships which 
went public. Such a distinction is important especially if we are inter 
ested in estimating new investment in the various industries. It was not 
possible to get a yearwise breakdown of companies which were already 
established and those which were newly formed but a survey carried out 
by a World Bank study provides us with an estimate for the years 1962 
to 1968. 
TABLE I 
Year Capital of established Percent Capital Percent 
_companies being listed_of 
new 
firms_ 
1962 30 28 77 72 
1963 35 26 102 74
1964 22 12 155 88 
1965 95 53 85 47 
1966 35 32 75 68 
1967 20 14 119 86 
1968 62 39 96 61 
Source : IBRD Industrialization of Pakistan, Volume III, Annexe I. 
As one can see from the above table except for 1965 the major 
portion of companies added to Stock Exchange represented capital of 
new firms. 
TABLE II 
Profitability-Industry-wise (Gross Profits as Per cent of Net Assets) 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
1. Cotton Textiles 18.7 16.1 15.4 15.1 16.5 20.0 16.6 
1-A. 28 Continuous Cos. - 16.9 15.9 15.7 17.0 21.7 17.8 
2. Other Textiles 8.0 7.8 6.0 5.6 8.8 7.5 6.8 
3. Jute 18.0 14.2 20.4 7.6 10.7 13.2 11.6 
4. Cement 10.9 11.1 9.5 10.2 10.7 12.1 10.5 
5. Chemicals 13.1 9.0 8.8 9.4 3.5 8.8 9.9 
5-A. 4 Continuous Cos. - 20.9 20.4 20.4 23.0 23.8 21.5 
6. Engineering and 
Construction 22.9 18.0 22.2 18.5 21.4 17.8 13.7 
7. Fuel and Power 14.8 13.1 13.2 12.6 14.8 15.6 17.6 
8. Transport and 
Communication 17.0 18.2 14.2 15.7 17.1 17.8 16.5 
9. Sugar and Allied 30.4 14.4 15.9 10.4 19.7 18.5 19.8 
9-A. Continuous 
Cos._- 19.6 21.7 12.8 32.5 25.0 20.8 
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TABLE III 
Profitability-Industry-wise (Net Pre-tax Profits as per cent of Net Assets) 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
1. Cotton Textiles 14.6 12.2 11.5 10.7 12.4 14.6 11.3 
1-A. 28 Continuous Cos. - 12.8 11.8 11.3 12.5 15.9 11.9 
2. Other Textiles 6.0 5.3 4.6 4.0 5.7 3.9 3.2 
3. Jute 13.8 11.1 17.5 4.9 6.4 9.0 7.0 
4. Cement 7.8 7.9 7.5 7.8 8.0 7.0 5.6 
5. Chemicals 10.5 7.0 6.9 7.1 3.5 4.9 5.2 
5-A. 4 Continuous Cos. - 16.2 15.7 18.1 18.5 18.7 16.2 
6. Engineering and 
Construction 18.6 12.7 17.3 14.7 17.1 13.7 9.5 
7. Fuel and Power 10.5 8.9 8.4 7.6 9.5 9.9 11.9 
8. Transport and 
Communication 8.8 13.5 8.6 8.2 8.8 8.7 7.3 
9. Sugar 27.9 11.5 12.4 6.8 16.6 14.1 14.8 
9-A. 7 Continuous Cos. - 15.7 16.8 8.3 28.2 20.9 16.9 
TABLE IV 
Re-investment of Profits in Selected Industries 
( Gross Savings as per cent of Gross Profits ) 
Average Average 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1964-69 1959-63 
Textiles and Allied 50.0 53.3 45.1 40.1 54.0 55.1 49.6 49.6 
Cotton Textiles 49.9 55.3 49.6 37.8 53.8 53.3 50.0 - 
Other Textiles 50.6 44.0 22.3 50.6 54.6 64.7 47.8 - 
Jute 47.5 44.9 59.5 44.5 53.2 55.0 50.8 58.2 
Cement 61.8 69.4 69.7 62.2 51.2 67.2 63.6 50.4 
Chemicals 40.8 40.7 47.6 13.3 9.2 56.0 31.5 44.0 
Engineering 44.3 58.1 51.9 44.6 29.8 40.5 44.9 43.4 
Transport and 89.7 92.9 85.5 86.1 82.7 83.2 86.7 84.6 
Communication 
Sugar and Allied 57.9 42.5 56.4 42.7 48.9 47.7 49.4 
- 
Fuel and Power 63.0 54.5 54.5 48.0 51.5 54.0 54.3 47.2 
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TABLE V 
Distribution of Dividends in Selected Industries 
[WINTER 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Average Average 
1969 1964-69 1959-63 
Textiles and Allied 22.8 21.3 
Cotton Textiles 23.1 20.2 
Other Textiles 
Jute 
Cement 
Chemicals 
Engineering 
Transport 
Sugar 
20.9 26.1 
24.8 
15.8 
23.1 
18.0 
5.6 
10.2 
32.2 
14.1 
22.6 
19.2 
5.2 
24.8 
Fuel and Power 15.1 20.7 
28.0 
27.3 
32.0 
20.8 
20.6 
22.4 
21.1 
13.1 
26.0 
21.8 
31.8 
32.8 
27.4 
32.0 
30.9 
49.7 
22.0 
12.2 
37.3 
26.0 
26.8 
24.8 
34.3 
31.5 
37.2 
57.0 
31.3 
12.3 
25.7 
25.1 
25.3 
24.1 
36.7 
29.8 
24.0 
33.0 
15.0 
31.7 
26.0 
25.6 
27.5 
29.7 
24.7 
33.1 
24.1 
10.6 
26.0 
19.0 
16.4 
18.0 
20.2 
21.0 
10.0 
22.0 
19.8 20.0 20.6 26.2 
TABLE VI 
Ratio of Depreciation to Gross Profits 
Average Average 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1964-69 1959-63 
Textiles and 22.3 24.7 25.8 28.1 33.9 28.6 27.2 20.8 
Allied 
Cotton Textiles 21.9 24.4 25.4 27.8 33.2 25.1 26.3 - 
Other Textiles 24.7 25.7 27.7 29.3 36.9 46.3 31.8 - 
Jute 23.3 21.4 13.9 36.2 39.0 33.8 27.9 25.6 
Cement 28.2 26.9 16.4 23.5 24.8 32.1 52.3 30.4 
Chemicals 20.1 22.6 20.5 37.1 69.0 46.3 35.9 17.8 
Engineering 18.3 28.5 21.1 34.3 13.5 17.8 22.3 32.2 
Transport 47.8 92.6 44.7 50.9 47.9 48.0 47.0 71.0 
Sugar 8.2 19.6 22.0 36.4 15.1 23.5 20.8 78.0 
Fuel and Power 31.1 32.4 35.6 40.5 35.2 36.1 35.2 32.6 
